Quick and accurate detection of cyber attack is key to the normal operation of the smart grid system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The smart grid transforms the legacy power grid that provides a one-way centrally generated power flow to end users into a more distributed and dynamic system of two-way flow of power and information [1] . In a large-scale power system, the increased connectivity and communication load lead to severe security challenges arising from physical faults and malicious attacks. The occurrence of cyber attacks can result in energy loss and safety concerns [2] [3] . Therefore, there is an urgent need for effective and economical mechanisms to detect structured attacks and to safeguard the smart grid.
space model of a bus with frequency drift, and the CUSUM change detector for attack detection based on the state estimation. Exploiting historical observations, we further propose an adaptive sampling strategy such that the controller maintains a large sampling interval when the system is believed to be normal and quickly reduces the interval when the attack is considered likely.
The adaptive sampling strategy efficiently reduces the rate of taking local measurements, while the detection delay performance is almost unaffected. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that even with the adaptive sampling strategy, our proposed method can quickly detect various attacks in a smart grid with high efficiency and adaptivity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the system models under both normal and attacked conditions, and presents the problem formulation. In Section III, we present the proposed state estimation and attack detection algorithm, as well as the adaptive sampling strategy. In Section IV, the proposed method is applied in a simulated power grid system and its performance is compared with the extended-Kalman-filter-based estimation method in [15] and conventional detection rules in [10] . Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We begin by presenting the state-space model under the normal operation, and then specify the measurement models for several typical attacks in a real operating grid followed by the problem statement.
We consider a discrete-time state-space model for a power system. Let x(k) and y(k) denote the state and measurement vectors at the k th sampling instant, respectively. Then we have the following general state-space model:
where f (·) is the state transition function, h(·) is the measurement function, Δt(k) is the time interval between the k th and the (k + 1) th samples, w(k) is the process noise vector, and v(k) is the measurement noise vector. In the following subsections, detailed models under both normal and faulty conditions are presented.
A. Model under Normal Conditions
For power system monitoring, sensors or meters are deployed to take measurements at various locations over time. Typically, these meters can send the measurement data (e.g., bus voltage) to a central controller via wired or wireless communication. In particular, we derive the state-space model based on the power grid voltage signal. The three-phase voltage signal at a given bus can be described by [16] , V a (t) = V a cos(tω + φ a ) + e a (t),
where t denotes the continuous time; V i and φ i denote the voltage amplitude and the initial phase angle of signal i ∈ {a, b, c}; ω = 2πf 0 where f 0 is typically equal to 50Hz or 60Hz. Note that, in practice, power systems are subject to frequency variation, e.g., f 0 varies from 60Hz to 61Hz. The additive noise e i (t) is modeled by a white zero-mean Gaussian process. Note that in an ideally balanced power system, V a = V b = V c , and φ b = φ a − the transformation can be written as [16] ,
V β (t) = V β cos(tω + φ β ) + e β (t).
We define the following five state variables including the in-phase and quadrature signals along with the grid frequency based on (10) and (11) [17] [15]:
x 4 (t) = V β sin(tω + φ β ),
Recalling the general model in (1)- (2) and defining the state vector
T corresponding to the k th sampling instant, then we can write the following state transition equation [18] :
It is assumed that the process noise w(k) under both normal and faulty conditions is white Gaussian with covariance matrix W , i.e., w(k) ∼ N (0, W ). The parameter ε characterizes the slowly time-varying characteristic of the grid frequency.
T . The measurement equation in (2) can then be written as
where the measurement noise v(k) ∼ N (0, R), and is uncorrelated with w(k), and
B. Models for Typical Attacks
In this paper, three typical attacks in a power grid are considered. Under each attack, the measurement equation varies while the state transition equation remains the same as (13).
1) Denial of Service Attack:
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is a cyber-attack which occurs when some components or resources become unavailable due to external adversaries. The DoS attack can be triggered by flooding the system with superfluous requests, which jams the communication channel and prevents legitimate data from being transmitted. In a smart grid, the DoS attack is modeled as the lack of measurement data at the central controller [19] . Thus, the observed signal at the controller is characterized by a Gaussian noise u(k) with mean 0 and covariance U , i.e.,
Note that, in general, the values of U and R may not be the same.
2) Random Attack: The random attack is modeled by an additive term, y a (k), which manipulates the original meter readings at the sampling instant k as
We consider it an attack event of interest when y a (k) 2 ≥ a 0 , where a 0 is a predetermined lower bound on the magnitude of an attack.
3) False Data Injection Attack: The false data injection attack is induced when the compromised meters forge the events that do not occur. Assume that the attacker knows the topology of a power system and can control a subset of meters from different buses that are affected by the attack for the k th measurement. Now consider the attack affecting a given bus. The measurement model under attack at the given bus is [10] y
where 1(k) = 1 if the given bus is attacked at time k, and 1(k) = 0 otherwise, and y a (k) is the malicious input from the attacker. Comparing (17) and (18), it is seen that the false data injection attack can be intermittent whereas the random attack is persistent.
C. Problem Statement
To jointly estimate the state of the bus and detect an attack based on voltage measurements, the controller needs to address the following problems.
1) State Estimation:
The state variable x(k) cannot be measured directly. We need to estimate
reported by the meter at that bus.
2) Detection Rule: Our goal is to detect any attack as quickly as possible. After obtaining the state estimate at each sampling instant, according to a specific detection rule, the controller needs to make a decision on whether to trigger the attack alarm immediately or take more measurements to update the state estimate.
3) Sampling Interval Adaptation: Since the traditional uniform sampling strategy may lead to extensive measurements and high communication load between the controller and local meters, we propose to reduce the number of measurements by adjusting the sampling interval Δt(k)
adaptively. The basic idea is to maintain a large sampling interval during the normal operation and reduce the sampling interval upon observing irregular fluctuations.
III. SMC-BASED STATE ESTIMATION AND ATTACK DETECTION
The proposed framework for state estimation and attack detection is illustrated in Fig. 1 In the following subsections, we first present the SMC-based algorithm to estimate the system state given the sampling interval Δt(k), and then specify the CUSUM-based attack detection rule. Finally, we present a strategy to adaptively adjust Δt(k) to reduce the measurement cost and the communication load between the meter and the controller.
A. State Estimation via SMC Algorithm
Our proposed attack detection approach is based on the state estimation by the SMC method.
In SMC [20] , a set of weighted samples are used to approximate an underlying distribution that is to be estimated. And the samples and their associated weights are sequentially updated based on the new measurements.
The proposed SMC-based state estimator is summarized in Algorithm 1. The algorithmic details are presented as follows.
• Initialization Algorithm 1 SMC-based State Estimator
, according to the prior distribution
Generate the current samples x (j) (k) according to (21) . 4: Update the weight w j (k) according to (22) and normalize it.
5:
Compute the state and error estimates, x(k) and e(k), according to (24) and (25). 6: Perform resampling if N eff is below a given threshold. 7: end for
, from the prior probability density function characterized by x 0 and Σ 0 , i.e.,
Set initial weights w j (0) = 1/N for all j.
• Online State Estimation
During the online phase, the controller sequentially updates the state estimate. An SMC update step consists of sample generation, weight update, and resampling, as highlighted in Algorithm 1.
1) Sample generation:
The basic idea of SMC is to perform the sequential importance
are drawn from some trial distribution
. Here we choose the state transition density as the trial distribution, i.e.,
Hence according to (13) ,
2) Weight update: The corresponding weight w j (k) for sample x (j) (k) is calculated by
where the normalized weight w j (k) is given as
Given the current weighted samples {x
, we can estimate the state vector and the error vector as
3) Resampling: The resampling step aims to avoid the problem of degeneracy of the SMC algorithm, that is, the situation that all but one of the importance weights are close to zero [21] [22]. The basic solution is to retain the samples with high weights and discard the samples with low weights.
The resampling is implemented only when the effective number of particles N eff is below a predetermined threshold N thr . An estimate of N eff is given by
which reflects the variation of the weights [21] . If N eff is less than a given threshold, N thr , we perform resampling to obtain N new samples,
, with equal weights w j (k) = 1/N .
That is, draw N samples from the current sample set with probabilities proportional to the corresponding weights.
B. Attack Detection via CUSUM Test
As given by (14)- (18), the statistical models for measurements before and after the attack occurrence are the basis to formulate a change detection problem which aims at the quickest reaction to the sudden change [23] [24] . The basic strategy is to utilize the sequential measurements to achieve high time resolution, and thus minimize the detection delay subject to the constraint on the false alarm period. At the k th sampling instant, the detector takes the current measurement y(k), and computes a decision statistic g k , based on which it decides whether or not to declare an attack.
To facilitate the description of the proposed detection rule, we first write the conditional probability density functions of measurements corresponding to the null hypothesis θ 0 and the alternative hypothesis θ a ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 } (θ 1 for DoS attack, θ 2 for random attack, and θ 3 for false data injection attack) as
where
and {R 0 , ..., R 3 } denote the corresponding covariances. Given the models in (14)- (18),
For each attack type θ a ∈ {θ 1 , θ 2 , θ 3 }, the occurrence of the attack can be detected at time T via the following sequential change detection procedure, called CUSUM test [23] ,
with R a ∈ {R 1 , R 2 , R 3 } denoting the covariance under different alternative hypotheses, and λ is a threshold.
Given a predetermined false alarm period γ, the threshold is approximated by λ ≈ ln γ [23] .
In our case of attack detection, the stopping time T is the first time that g k exceeds the threshold, indicating the occurrence of an attack and terminating the current detection cycle.
Since the true state x(k), the exact value of y a (k) or 1(k) are unknown, we need to replace the terms ε k,θ 0 and ε k,θa in (37) with their estimates based on the output of the SMC state estimator, i.e.,
where x(k) is given in (1).
For the random attack model in (40), the attack sequence y a (k) is estimated as
with e(k) given in (25) . (42) implies that the attack sequence is approximated by the estimation error e(k) as long as e(k) 2 exceeds the lower bound of the attack magnitude of interest.
For the false attack model in (41), the attack term 1(k)y a (k) is estimated as
The estimator in (43) ensures that, given the k th sample, the bus is estimated as normal or attacked such that l k is maximized.
C. Adaptive Sampling Strategy
Conventionally, the sampling interval Δt(k) is a constant, i.e., Δt(k) = Δ for all k. Here we propose an adaptive sampling strategy that adjusts the next sampling interval based on past observations. Intuitively, the sampling interval should be relatively large when the system is under normal operation and it should quickly decrease when an attack is perceived as likely. To that end, we adopt the idea from the congestion control for the network transmission control protocol (TCP), i.e., the additive increase/multiplicative decrease scheme for obtaining a proper data package size [25] . Specifically, the proposed sampling method has two phases described as follows.
1) Normal Operation Phase (Initialization):
During the normal operation, we aim to quickly find a default sampling interval which balances between the resource cost and the measurement resolution. Suppose that the minimum achievable sampling interval is T m . We start with the sampling interval Δt(i = 0) = T m , and Δt(i) is doubled after each measurement i as long as the error does not exceed a predetermined threshold, d 0 , i.e.,
where e(i) is given by (25) . Denote the maximum sampling interval satisfying (44) as Δt 0 , which is set as the default sampling interval under normal operation.
2) Online Attack Detection Phase: When the controller believes that the estimation error is reasonable for normal operations, the sampling interval can be increased as
where the function x rounds x to the nearest multiple of T m , the coefficient a < 1 determines the growth rate of the sampling interval, b > 1 is a predetermined integer defining the upper bound of the interval to ensure the detection performance, and the threshold
When the controller observes the potential of an attack occurrence, it should increase the sampling frequency significantly to achieve higher measurement resolution until an attack alarm is triggered, i.e.,
where d 2 > d 1 is the threshold, the coefficient c < 1 controls the decreasing rate and the sampling interval cannot be further refined when T m is reached.
After detecting the attack, the sampling interval is reset to the default value Δt 0 , and adjusted by (45) and (46) in the next cycle. . In the initialization phase, the default sampling interval Δt 0 = 8T m is quickly reached in the third step. In the online phase, the sampling interval rises from 8T m to 3Δt 0 = 24T m .
When a large deviation is observed in the 8 th step, the sampling interval is adjusted to 3T m after the 12 th sample.
Finally, the complete procedure of our proposed attack detection method is summarized in Algorithm 3.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present the performance of the proposed method in detecting typical attacks at a given bus in a power system, i.e., denial of service attacks, random attacks and false data injection attacks.
For each type of attacks, we first present the estimation performance of SMC, and then examine the delay performance of the proposed attack detector with the adaptive sampling scheme. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm, we also compare its delay performance with that of the extended-Kalman-filter-based estimation method [15] in combination with conventional attack detectors [10] . Finally, we evaluate the amount of resource saved by the proposed adaptive sampling strategy. Note that, for a fair comparison, the average delay given a certain false alarm period is measured by the equivalent number of samples between the Algorithm 2 Proposed Attack Detector 1: Initialization:
Obtain the default sampling interval Δt 0 given d 0 according to (44).
3:
For SMC, obtain the initial samples {x (j) (0)} N j=1 , and set the threshold for resampling.
4:
For the CUSUM test, set the lower bound for an attack of interest, a 0 , and the attack decision thresholds, λ.
5:
For the sampling interval adaptation, set the coefficients, a, b and c, and the thresholds, d 1 and d 2 . 6: Online attack detection: 7: for k = 1, 2, ... do, 2) Run one step of SMC update in Algorithm 1. Trigger the attack alarm and break the loop. 13 :
Update the next sampling interval Δt(k) according to (45) and (46). 15: end if 16: Wait Δt(k).
17:
k = k + 1.
18:
Loop back to Line 8. 19 : end for attack occurrence and the attack alert using the default sampling frequency Δt 0
.

A. Simulation Setup
In our experiments, we simulate different types of faults in a power system using Matlab.
The detailed setups to implement the proposed method and other methods for comparison are described below.
1) Proposed Method:
A sinusoidal voltage signal with random Gaussian noise is generated. 
2) Methods for Comparison:
To tackle the nonlinear estimation problem, the methods in [15] utilizes the extended Kalman filter (EKF). We compare the estimation result with that of the EKF to demonstrate the higher accuracy of our SMC method.
To evaluate the performance of attack detection, we compare our CUSUM-based detector with conventional ones [10] , namely, the χ 2 detector and Euclidean distance detector, under uniform sampling with the sampling interval fixed to Δt 0 . Moreover, the performance of another detector based on the well-known likelihood ratio test with adaptive sampling is also compared. Note that the following detection methods do not need prior knowledge about the attack patterns, and can trigger an alarm without differentiating the attack type.
where the residual covariance matrix S(k) is computed as
with
Then a χ 2 test [10] will declare the occurrence of an attack after the k th 0 sample with
where λ 1 = χ and the degrees of freedom d = 2 − 1 = 1.
Euclidean-Distance (E-D) Detector:
Since the false data injection attack can be carefully crafted to pass conventional statistical detection, e.g., χ 2 detector, another detection rule based on the Euclidean distance metric is proposed in [10] . Here we adopt a windowed Euclidean distance measure among the past W true voltage measurements, {V i (k − W + 1), ..., V i (k)}, and the corresponding estimated values,
reconstructed from the state estimates, i.e.,
An attack alarm is triggered after the k th 0 sample with
Log-likelihood-ratio (LLR) Detector: This windowed detection rule takes the latest W likelihood-ratio evaluations into account. Given a threshold λ 3 , the decision of an attack is made after the k th 0 sample where
For a fair comparison of the detection performance, the thresholds, λ (for our method), λ 1 , λ 2 and λ 3 (for the conventional detectors in [10] , and the LLR detector), are tuned to satisfy the same target false alarm periods. The window sizes for both the E-D detector and the LLR detector are set as W = 10.
B. Detection of DoS Attack
To simulate the DoS attack, the controller is prevented from observing the upcoming local measurements after the attack which occurs at t = 0.05s and lasts for the following 0.05s. To illustrate the estimation process, the estimated sinusoid output in phase a, V a (t) (reconstructed from the state variables), is presented in Fig. 3 , in comparison with the true input voltage signal
given the large measurement noise (σ 2 = 10
−3
). Before the attack occurrence at t = 0.05s, the estimated values by the SMC algorithm closely track the true signal. After t = 0.05s, the gap between the estimated signal and the true signals becomes obvious. It can be observed that the estimate by the EKF generally results in larger errors in comparison with our SMC method.
We evaluate the average attack detection delay performance of different methods as a function of the false alarm period γ (in terms of the equivalent number of samples under default sampling frequency). The delay was the average of 5000 simulations. Fig. 4 (a) and (b) shows the average delay performances for detecting the DoS attack with different process noises. On one hand, given a specific false alarm period, the proposed algorithm with uniform sampling intervals has the shortest average delays in both cases, implying higher efficiency of our method. On the other hand, when the sampling interval Δ(k) is adaptively adjusted, the delay performance is only affected slightly. Even given a large false alarm period which is the desired case for real applications, the difference between the two sampling strategies is still very small. Compared with the EKF-based χ 2 detector with uniform sampling and the LLR-test detector, the proposed approach has less average delays given the same false alarm periods even with adaptive sampling. ). For each time period specified in the legend, the average sampling interval T x is obtained by computing the ratio between the length of the specified time period T x , and the total number of samples at the controller, n x , during the corresponding period, i.e., T x = T x /n x . Before the attack occurs, the controller starts with the default sampling frequency (after initialization), and the sampling interval under normal operation is around 20T m . After the attack occurrence, the controller quickly shrinks the sampling interval to increase the measurement resolution. For the last 5 samples before the detection decision is made, the sampling interval gets closer to the smallest sampling period corresponding to the highest achievable sampling frequency of the local meter (Δt(k) = 2.3T m ∼ 2.5T m ). By comparing results under different measurement noises, we can conclude that the average sampling interval is larger in general when the noise level is lower.
As shown in Table I , the amount of resource saving by the adaptive sampling is evaluated based on the average sampling interval, T a = 1 2
T normal + T attack , in comparison with the uniform sampling approach. Explicitly, the resource saving percentage is given by 1 − T m /T a × 100%.
For different process noise levels (σ 2 = 10 
C. Detection of Random Attack
Since the the random attack occurs when the controller obtains manipulated measurement data rather than the true local observations, in our simulation, the faulty signals can be generated by adding an attack vector y a (k) to the original observations. The attack sequence for
and V c (t) are sequentially generated by 1.5 cos((2π × 65)t k − π/4), where t k denotes the time instant for the k th measurement, and is transformed into α − β space accordingly to obtain the attack sequence y a (k). Note that all the observations from V a (t), V b (t) and V c (t) are affected by the same attack sequence simultaneously. operation and quickly reduces the interval after the attack occurrence. Table II demonstrates that a great amount of resource can be saved by implementing the adaptive sampling method (>92.1%).
D. Detection of False Data Injection Attack
The simulated data injection sequence is generated by y a (k + 1) = y a (k) + z, where the random elements in z are independently generated from the uniform distribution in types of attacks as the obtained measurements at the controller at different sampling instants can be either normal or faulty after the first attack occurrence, depending on whether the current state variable is affected by the attack. In our simulation, the value of the indicator function 1(k) at different sampling instant are independently generated from the binomial distribution, such that 1(k) = 1 with probability of p = 0.8.
The estimation result is shown in Fig. 9 , where the estimate of V a (t) gradually deviates from the true signal after the attack occurrence at t = 0.05s. Compared with the previous two types of attacks, the gap between the estimates and the true signals under the false data injection attack does not become obvious until t = 0.06, implying a longer detection delay. Fig. 10 (a) and (b) show the average delay performance for detecting the false data injection attack given different measurement noises. In response to the attack occurrence at t = 0.05s, the proposed method outperforms the others with less delays given the same false alarm period and the adaptive sampling scheme. Fig. 11 summaries the average sampling interval for detecting the false data injection attack, where we can observe that the average interval is smaller than that for the other two types of attack in general. Table. III presents the result of the average resource saving, where the values varies from 92.0% to 92.9% under difference conditions.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a joint SMC-based state estimation and CUSUM change detection method that quickly detects different attacks at a three-phase bus in a smart grid. The proposed SMC filtering tracks the non-linear state-space model when the grid frequency is slowing drifting, and the CUSUM-type detector can be adapted to various unknown attack patterns. Considering the resource cost on sampling and communication, an adaptive sampling strategy is proposed such that the controller adjusts the sampling interval based on the bus state estimation. The proposed method is implemented to detect three typical attacks in a power system, and compared with existing methods. The simulation results demonstrate that our method can quickly detect various faults without any prior knowledge. Furthermore, the proposed adaptive sampling strategy reduces the rate of taking measurements significantly while the detection delay is almost unaffected, which makes it suitable to be applied in real power grids.
